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Introduction
This chapter addresses community development with indigenous 
communities in Ecuadorian and Peruvian Amazonia, whose territories 
have been the site of conflicts with the oil extraction industry. 
The argument developed in this chapter interconnects community 
development and environmental justice and is the result of a dialogue 
between the authors, based on case studies from the experience of one 
of us, Martínez, who worked between 2000 and 2009 as an activist, 
researcher and community worker with indigenous communities in 
the oil production areas of the Amazon. The indigenous peoples with 
whom Martínez conducted her work were the Cofán from Dureno, 
the Kichwa from Sarayaku,[[Please confirm correction]] both 
in Ecuador, and the Shipibo-Konibo from Canaán de Cachiyaku in 
Peru. The case studies include work with these groups as well as with 
employees of the oil companies and ‘intermediaries’ in the NGOs, 
the Church, activists and academics, including many adopting the 
role of community development practitioner, whether employed to 
do so or not.
Martínez describes the background to this work:
‘My original intention was to bring indigenous voices to 
the forefront of academic debate: to expose the impacts 
of the unsustainable development promoted by the oil 
industry and to identify the strategies used by indigenous 
people to regain control of their own development. From 
the beginning I thought my main informants would be 
indigenous people with whom I had built relationships over 
the years through my work in Amazonian communities. 
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However, people in all the oil-affected communities I 
worked with considered it necessary to include the points 
of view and strategies used by the ‘powerful’ oil companies 
as well as the indigenous people. Therefore, the decision of 
researching the ‘powerful’ in the oil conflict was taken in 
agreement with my informants. The ethical stance of the 
research remained politically committed to the interests of 
the indigenous ‘survivor’ communities.’
There is a lack of critical research about the powerful in society, and 
the need to ‘study up’ (Williams, 1989) has not been fully addressed. 
This is accentuated by the commodification of research and the barriers 
which powerful actors erect against researchers who are attempting to 
scrutinise the state and corporate power (Tombs and Whyte, 2002). 
The powerful are not exempt from public scrutiny. If they do not 
provide information when confronted with critical and independent 
research, they leave researchers with few options but to use deception 
and selective communication. Martínez explains:
‘When researching the ‘powerful’ and their activities in 
oil-affected areas, I felt at times as a spy, an unintended but 
necessary role to access information from the oil companies, 
an exhausting and stressful double-role. One coping 
mechanism was my work in the indigenous communities. 
The reason why I embarked on this research was because 
various communities and friends had asked me to. I had 
previous experience of working as a community worker 
and as an activist in oil-affected areas, and was in an ideal 
position to carry out this type of research. This required 
spending long periods of time in indigenous communities 
where I was given various community development roles, 
from leading workshops to designing project proposals and 
helping to organise cultural events. On other occasions I 
found myself in the middle of a protest or a violent situation, 
and needed to have a standpoint, as my role as an activist 
and international witness was required.’ 
In this context, the detached researcher has no place: on the contrary, 
community development, research and activism may go hand in hand 
and each can support the other. In that sense, the case material discussed 
here should be regarded as activist ethnography and action research 
undertaken by Martínez (Reason and Bradbury, 2006). This chapter 
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constitutes a critical reflection on these experiences in dialogue with 
Scandrett.
We understand community development to be a process through 
which communities collectively mobilise to defend or enhance 
their means of livelihood and quality of life and a practice by key 
individuals who consciously facilitate this process, whether through 
community appointment, political commitment or professional 
employment. Theorists of community development have recognised 
the contradictions in its practice. Since the origins of community 
development in European colonialism and ‘development’ as a 
means of building the allegiance of post-independence populations, 
community workers have been located within communities that have 
been identified as ‘problematic’ by outsiders, and tasked with the 
contradictory role of supporting communities to identify and mobilise 
in support of their collective interests which may be opposed to the 
interests of the powerful (Mayo, 2008).
For the purpose of this chapter we have classified the actors in the 
relationship between community and the oil industry as the ‘powerful’, 
the ‘survivors’ and the ‘intermediaries’, all of whom have some locus 
in community work. The ‘powerful’ includes the state and foreign 
oil companies, state institutions, public relations (PR) companies, 
the military and foreign governments. The ‘survivors’ consist of 
indigenous people and their local, regional and national organisations. 
The ‘intermediaries’ include local, national and international NGOs 
and aid agencies, the Church, local councils, activists, academics and 
some governmental institutions that lead with indigenous issues.1 These 
categorisations are not intended to be analytical but rather heuristic 
and it is acknowledged that complex diversity exists within them. 
However, in interpreting the role which key agents play in the processes 
that are either explicitly named or may be understood as community 
development, this categorisation is helpful.
In a region where the presence of the state is minimal, the oil 
industry has become the main source for community development in 
indigenous communities through its ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(CSR) programmes in an effort to consolidate its presence in 
indigenous territory, what Collins (2006) has called ‘dispossession 
through participation’. In many cases these industry-led attempts 
at community development are in conflict with communities’ own 
development strategies and life projects. Some indigenous groups have 
evolved and transformed over the centuries into societies that represent 
a troublesome alternative to the current dominant neoliberal system 
based on concentration of power and accumulation of wealth.
The politics of environmental justice
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Neoliberal states in Latin America: oil industry expansion 
and ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’
The national and transnational oil industry has been able to act with 
almost total impunity since the start of its operations in Latin America 
at the beginning of the last century (Kimerling and FCUNAE, 1993; 
Varea, 1995; Maldonado, 2001; Sawyer, 2004; Oilwatch, 2005; López, 
2007). Four main interrelated factors favoured the unregulated growth 
of the industry: (1) the dire need of states for quick-fix and resource-
based solutions to the economic crises of their countries; (2) the shift 
in the 1980s from a corporatist to a neoliberal system imported from 
the US and other Western countries; (3) the lack of regulations on 
environmental and indigenous rights issues; and (4) expansion of the 
civilisatory mission of the evangelical group, Summer Institute of 
Linguistics (now SIL International).2
The Ecuadorian case is illustrative of an economy that suffered two 
major resource crises: the cacao crisis in the 1920s and the banana 
crisis in the 1960s. As Acosta (2003) points out, in the 1980s Ecuador 
‘changed from poverty-stricken banana grower to new-rich producer 
of oil’:
Thanks to the oil bonanza, the GDP increased between 
1972 and 1981 at an average annual rate of 8% with 
spectacular rates in some years (more than 25.3% in 1973), 
in particular for the industry, which increased by an average 
of 10% per year; while the product per person increased 
from $260 in 1970 to $1,668 in 1981.
Although at the beginning of the 1970s the industry was under the 
control of the state, its remarkable profits in the following years attracted 
foreign investment. This, together with a favourable international 
climate for oil investments and the shift from a corporatist to a 
neoliberal ideology in the government, aided the entry into the country 
of transnational oil companies (Perreault, 2001; 2003: 66). Neoliberal 
regimes have also encouraged corporate-led globalisation by promoting 
free trade, privatisation and deregulation. Oil transnationals operating in 
Latin America did not have to worry, until recently, about complying 
with any environmental regulations or national and international laws 
regarding the individual and collective rights of indigenous people.
While the lengthy absence of environmental laws eased the 
uncontrolled development of the industry in indigenous territory, 
the lack of a regulated frame for consultation with and participation 
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of the affected communities has become one of the main complaints 
of indigenous peoples and organisations (Melo, 2006: 19). The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 stipulates 
that indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted regarding 
any legislative or administrative measure that may affect them, oil 
developments included. However, in the case of resource exploration, 
the state is the owner of the subsoil. This means that indigenous peoples 
do not have integral ownership of their territory, since they own only 
what is on the surface. The fight for outright ownership of their lands 
has been the most contested issue during the 20 years of gestation of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP). The declaration signals a great advance since it recognises 
the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and free, prior 
and informed consent but it still does not give any veto control to 
the communities, a matter that is highly contested by governments.
Finally, another important factor for the entry of the oil industry 
into the Amazon was the previous arrival of the missionaries of the 
SIL, widely considered to have opened the doors to the extractive 
industries in the Amazon in the 1960s and 1970s by breaking the 
social cohesion of the indigenous communities and building airstrips 
that were later used by the oil companies (Stoll, 1983; Perkins, 2005: 
141–3; Yashar, 2005: 146).
During the first years of the oil industry companies did not have to 
worry about the environmental and social impacts of their operations. 
Indigenous organisations were in their infancy, and most indigenous 
communities were unaware of the impacts that the industry might 
bring. Government planning was beginning to show recognition of 
environmental and indigenous rights, while social control in indigenous 
communities was assured by the presence of evangelical and Catholic 
missionaries. This does not mean that indigenous communities 
peacefully allowed the entry of the industry. Company representatives, 
especially those in charge of the seismic phase of the operations, were 
subject to attacks by various indigenous groups, but overall their 
paternalist strategy of petty gifts and short-term unskilled jobs for 
indigenous people kept the resistance at bay.
Although localised indigenous protests had been common since 
the colonial period, indigenous peoples started to influence national 
politics by forming or joining class-based organisations. The gradual 
departure from class ideals was partly due to the influence of the new 
indigenous intellectuals and the promotion of indigenous culture by the 
Catholic Church (León, as cited by Van Cott, 2005: 104). Amazonian 
organisations found it easier to organise around ethnic demands than 
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Andean organisations. The social relations of production in much 
of the Andean region of many Latin American countries involved 
the hacienda system of contracted debt, in which Indian labourers 
(conciertos) were virtually owned by the hacienda owner. By contrast, 
in the Amazonian region the hacienda system had little impact. In 
addition, the remoteness of Amazonian communities, the bilingual 
education programmes promoted by missionaries versus the imposition 
of Spanish in public schools, and their special concept of territory 
contributed to the ‘indianisation’ of the movement. The main claim 
of Amazonian indigenous organisations was for indigenous territory, as 
the colonisation and extraction of natural resources promoted by both 
corporatist and neoliberal governments represented a direct threat to 
their collective subsistence. This constituted a marked difference from 
the concept of territory practised by Andean communities, where 
land was a social and economic production unit. The indigenous 
mobilisations in the 1990s consolidated the indigenous movements and 
made them visible and influential on a national and international scale.
The mobilisations carried out by the Amazonian indigenous 
movement during the last three decades have set an example of 
indigenous organising through non-violent actions and have marked 
the beginning of a new power relationship between the state and 
indigenous peoples whose demands could no longer be ignored. 
These mobilisations had an impact in the development of international 
law (ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP) and a whole range of 
international initiatives which have set up non-enforceable guidelines 
and principles for corporate responsibility, among them the United 
Nations Global Compact initiative and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.
These initiatives have considerably changed the pattern of relationship 
between the state, companies and communities. In order to operate in 
a friendly environment, companies in Latin America use community 
relations programmes (CRPs) as part of their CSR strategy. Parts of 
these agreements are compulsory for the companies by law, such as the 
compensation and reparation payments made for the use of the territory 
and for environmental contingencies. However, companies also see 
these programmes as voluntary ‘good neighbours agreements’[[You 
have used the term ‘good neighbourhood agreements’ in 
the next subheading. Please correct if required]] that can be 
negotiated to minimise conflict.
CRPs are often the only community development strategies in these 
regions. Oil companies claim these programmes seek to mitigate the 
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social impacts of oil extraction in the communities and to improve 
access to healthcare and education (Martínez, 2008). There are no 
binding international or national standards on how these programmes 
should be implemented (Varea, 1995; Wray, 2000; Narváez, 2004; 
Shamir, 2004). A common characteristic of all the programmes 
analysed in these case studies is that they have become a tool for the 
oil companies to access indigenous communities, promoting division 
and dependency on the company.
Visions of development
Community development led by the ‘powerful’: good 
neighbourhood agreements,[[See previous query]] PR strategy and 
the absence of the state
Wray (2000: 56–60), who carried out fieldwork in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon and examined the complex relations between the state, the 
companies and indigenous peoples, explains that the agreements 
reached during negotiation of a CRP vary depending on three factors: 
the phase of the oil operation, the level of international awareness about 
the specific project, and the strength of the indigenous organisation. 
We would add other factors: the PR strategy used by the company 
and the state to promote oil activities; the environmental and social 
record of the company; the size of the company; and whether it is 
national or transnational. During the seismic phase of the operations 
the agreement between the companies and the communities tends 
to be short term, since the company cannot assure the discovery of 
oil reserves, and if the finding is not economically viable it will cease 
operations in the area. In the exploration phase the agreements are long 
term, as this minimises conflict, and companies fund whole projects 
instead of specific demands. The first contact with the communities 
normally takes place through the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) or, more recently, through the consultation process. Some 
indigenous organisations complain that companies use the EIA to 
access the communities and start negotiations and the CRPs to secure 
their permanence in the communities.
What has happened in practice is illustrated by the case of the 
indigenous community of Sarayaku in Ecuador and the Argentinean 
oil company CGC. Although consultation had not taken place, CGC 
contracted the PR company Daimi Service to help them sign an 
agreement with the communities of the oil block and start seismic 
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operations in Sarayaku territory. In an interview a representative at 
Daimi explained:
‘This case was especially challenging for us, so I decided 
to invest my own money and told the company [CGC] 
that if I did not manage to sign agreements with all the 
communities in the oil block they would not have to pay 
me. They had tried before with other consultants and they 
achieved nothing, but we managed to sign a contract with 
26 of the 28 communities’ (David Luján, 15 March 2007).
Luján stated that the practices of his company are based on high levels 
of transparency, taking into account the perspectives of all the actors 
and working with the local authorities. This claim contrasts with 
interviews carried out with indigenous leaders from different areas 
in Ecuador who accused Daimi of favouring the interests of the oil 
companies, blackmailing leaders and working under cover.
CGC used an aggressive PR strategy in the Pastaza region because it 
met with strong resistance in the Sarayaku community. The Sarayaku 
fought back and organised the Kapari (meaning ‘shout’) campaign to 
create awareness of the conflict, which was supported internationally. 
The Sarayaku are an exceptional case, in which a single and isolated 
community has managed to resist what seemed inevitable, the 
exploitation of oil in its territory. However, the price paid for this 
resistance has been high, as the community has lived in a state of 
alertness and psychological pressure for the last decade, and the damage 
caused to the social network by the interruption of their cultural 
traditions, the animosity created with neighbouring communities and 
the violation of sacred places by CGC will be very difficult to repair.
Many of the oil contracts in the Amazon area were signed 30 years 
ago, when there was no need for consultation or CRPs. Although 
consultation rights and environmental regulations are not retroactive, 
communities that were never compensated for the use of their territory 
are now starting to claim compensation, as in the dispute between the 
Shipibo-Konibo people of Canaán in Peru and the Maple company. 
After various direct actions that brought the conflict to the national 
level, the community managed to sign a compensation agreement with 
the company and a long-term CRP. An indigenous leader of the local 
organisation FECONBU reflects on the struggle of the people of the 
community of Canaán for compensation and the direct actions – ‘fight 
actions’ in his words – that they took:
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‘Before the fight actions we got only palliatives from the 
company … then we carried out three fight actions and we 
waited a long time for the company … We proposed that the 
company should pay us five million soles [approximately 1.6 
million dollars] for the use of our territory over the years … 
What we have got is 152,000 soles per year [approximately 
49,800 dollars] and a community relations programme, but 
we still do not see results … The company thought we were 
asking for too much because they value the territory in a 
very different way … but this payment is just for the use 
of our land, no environmental or health impact assessment 
of our population has been done yet … as a federation we 
all agreed that we are against oil exploitation in our lands 
… We have a new company coming, Amerada Hess, they 
want to exploit oil in all the river basin, but we all agreed to 
say no … Now the problem is … when other communities 
see that here in Canaán we have got compensation, they 
may think this is easy to get, they may think oil companies 
are good for our development, but then what is going to 
be left for us in the future?’ (Arturo Valiente, interview, 17 
October 2006).
Valiente’s commentary stresses the importance of CRPs as a negotiating 
tool for both sides, but it also shows that they can be a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand communities that have not received any sort of 
compensation from the oil companies for decades are right to demand 
compensation which takes into consideration the value that indigenous 
peoples attach to their land. This is often a complex matter, since 
many of the affected areas have an unmeasurable value for the people. 
However, if a price for compensation is to be set, the calculations 
cannot be based only on the price per hectare set by the national 
government. On the other hand, the prospect of compensation and a 
long-term CRP can lead the community to engage in a development 
process over which they do not have control.
For many communities the CRP negotiated with the company, 
before or after oil exploitation, is the only external support they get, 
and for them it becomes a matter of survival and an opportunity for 
development. Many communities see transnational companies as 
institutions with endless funds which take out all the resources of the 
country without leaving real benefits for the people; their demands 
may therefore range from capacity-building training to the construction 
of a school or a road. Negotiation between an oil transnational and an 
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indigenous community is an uneven process, in which communities 
often do not have access to the information and legal advice necessary 
for fair negotiation. Even in the ideal case that a fair process is 
established, once the company takes on the role of the state a clientelist 
relationship is created, which is difficult to break.
The case of the state oil company and medium-size companies varies 
slightly, since they normally do not have the same economic resources 
to negotiate the CRPs as an oil transnational. The PR strategy of the 
national oil companies is also less aggressive, although practices such 
as militarisation of the oilfields and the cooption of indigenous leaders 
are common.
Companies are aware that they are replacing the state and that 
they should not be the ones in charge of the development of 
indigenous communities; however, most of the oil company CEOs 
and representatives interviewed for this research blame the state for its 
inability to institutionalise the extraction of resources in the Amazon 
region, its absence from the negotiation with communities, and the 
lack of investment in the communities in which oil is extracted.
Although state health and education programmes do not reach 
many indigenous communities, state presence is not entirely lacking 
in the Amazon region. For more than two decades, especially since 
the arrival of the oil industry, the region has gradually developed its 
administrative structures, and decentralised state institutions are present 
in every Amazonian province. National representatives of the state may 
not participate in the negotiations between the companies and the 
communities, but a multi-stakeholder local or regional board could 
be created to monitor the transparency and accountability of the oil 
operations and to decide the best way to distribute the percentage of 
the oil rent that by law goes to the local and regional governments. 
Although state institutions in the Amazon region are under-resourced 
they can still play an important role in institutionalising oil operations 
in the region.
The state and oil companies, as powerful actors in the oil conflict, 
are both responsible for this chaotic scenario. The absence of the 
state in some oil regions of Southern countries does not justify the 
methods employed by the oil companies to counter resistance and to 
negotiate with indigenous communities. Among these methods are 
divisionism, bribery, cooption, psychological pressure, militarisation 
and legal threats.
In both Ecuador and Peru the principal indigenous organisations 
and their non-indigenous allies have adopted a clear position against 
the extractive industries in indigenous territory or have demanded a 
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moratorium on all oil activities until better conditions for indigenous 
peoples can be guaranteed, but there are other indigenous organisations 
and voices which see in dialogue and negotiation with the industry the 
only means of assuring their development and they struggle to achieve 
a fair negotiation in which respect for indigenous culture is the main 
priority. The debate around the oil industry is polarised in these two 
countries. Indigenous peoples may differ in their understanding of 
how oil-rich territories should be managed and what are the possible 
alternatives to oil exploitation; however, they converge on vital issues 
such as the need to preserve their territory, culture and sovereignty. 
It is on constant dialogue and shared views that their future hangs.
Community development led by the ‘survivors’: education, 
cosmovision and political participation
Education seems to be vital for the cultural survival of all indigenous 
peoples. In those communities whose way of life has been affected 
by the oil industry, the realisation that education is a long-term 
survival mechanism is now internalised and has become a priority of 
development programmes led by the communities themselves.
In order to better respond to external threats such as the oil industry, 
indigenous people have identified various forms of education and 
training required. They have also stressed the need for an intercultural 
model of education which would depart from previous assimilatory 
policies and would focus instead on identity and diversity. Education 
of indigenous peoples is a political question, a right in itself linked to 
the right to self-determination. In Latin America national programmes 
on Intercultural Bilingual Education (IBE) were started a few decades 
ago with high expectations had by indigenous organisations that sought 
the decolonisation of indigenous peoples’ education.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to get into the details of IBE 
and what it has meant politically for indigenous peoples. However, the 
main failure of these programmes in Ecuador and Peru has been the 
control that these states and international institutions have exerted over 
them, leading to the imposition of the dominant culture and language 
in indigenous and rural areas, to the detriment of cultural diversity. The 
effects of this kind of education were described by a Cofán woman:
‘The western system doesn’t respect the ways we think 
and live, especially through education. That’s the biggest 
threat to indigenous peoples because it’s a silent weapon, 
much more dangerous even than the oil industry because it 
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colonises the hearts and minds of young people, of children, 
devaluing, and bit by bit it has the effect that the people, 
the system of [indigenous] peoples, the ancestral structure, 
becomes lost. That’s the big threat’ (Marta Flores, interview, 
12 February 2007).
Some oil-affected communities have decided to take more 
responsibility for their own education instead of waiting for reforms 
to materialise. Changes in the school curriculum introduced by the 
community include the participation of the elders to teach indigenous 
cosmovision, increasing the time the children spend in nature or 
in collective communitarian activities, and rescuing the use of the 
traditional costume instead of expensive state uniforms. These decisions 
are taken in the general assembly of the community. Meso-American 
cosmovision is a structured and systemic world view and related belief 
system that integrates the structure of space and rhythms of time into 
a unified whole and influences all the aspects of life.
Sarayaku, for example, has received external support to create its 
own programme for IBE teachers, counting on the help of foreign 
volunteer teachers who rotate every three months. The training 
provided in Sarayaku complies with the dispositions of the regional 
and national IBE programmes, but the community proposes the most 
relevant topics for the curriculum. For example, ‘globalisation and 
the age of information technology’ has become an important subject 
for the community as they are aware that part of their success against 
CGC is due to the use of media such as the Internet, radio and filming.
Indigenous people are also aware that education is not limited to 
the formal sector or the IBE programmes. There are other crucial 
educational routes if communities want to influence policies and 
secure representation at various levels of the decision-making process. 
One of these is the role of the community as cradle for the formation 
of leaders who may later work for the local and regional federations. 
Traditionally leaders have worked on a voluntary basis, their election a 
duty and an honour that could only be avoided with strong justification. 
Today, leaders from local federations may be paid if the organisation 
receives funds from NGOs or other institutions. Community members 
sometimes see leaders as more interested in the salaries offered for these 
positions than in representing their people. Although envy and mistrust 
will always exist, leaders and members of communities struggling 
against the oil industry have worked tirelessly as advocates of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, and some have risked their lives. The oil conflict has 
brought the leadership of the movement closer to the grassroots and has 
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also served as a springboard to the regional and national levels for those 
leaders who have been involved in local struggles. The conflict with 
the oil industry has also created the need to train the youth in rights 
and advocacy issues, as they will be the future leaders and responsible 
for organising resistance and developing strategies for survival. The 
training in advocacy and indigenous and territorial rights has gone 
hand in hand with community development activities around the 
revalorisation of traditional culture and the creation of spaces in which 
the elders and the youth can converge.
A leader of the Cofán community of Dureno explains:
‘Latterly the whole Cofán people has been worried because 
the last shamans are now dying, and then what’s going to 
happen? The problem has been lack of confidence, because 
preparing to be a shaman takes a long time and is difficult. 
The shamans don’t think the young people are interested, 
and at the same time the young people believe that the 
shamans don’t want to teach them. Also, since the oil 
companies’ arrival the sacred plants have been more difficult 
to find, and the young people go off to the towns and no 
longer have time for these teachings ... here an association 
of young people, AJONCE, has been formed with a double 
aim, on the one hand that they should know their rights 
and the threats that the oil industry holds over us, and on 
the other, to rescue our cosmovision’ (Ernesto Segundo, 
interview, 11 February 2007).
During the past five years [[For clarity, I suggest you substitute 
‘Since [year], …’ for ‘During the past five years’]] the community 
of Dureno has been approached on several occasions by national and 
foreign oil companies, and AJONCE has had an important role in 
maintaining the position of the community against oil operations in 
their territory. AJONCE has received a small amount of funding from 
Friends of the Earth, but has now managed to become sustainable 
through a traditional fish farm project and a programme of national 
and foreign volunteers. Recently AJONCE members built a house of 
yajé (a sacred plant of shamanism) as a centre for learning shamanism 
and other traditional teachings, but the location of the house at the top 
of a hill is strategic, as stated by one of the young members:
‘We decided to build the yajé house on the hill because it’s 
a secluded and pleasant place, good for learning shamanism 
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… but also we were worried by several bids to carry out 
mining on that hill … now, with the yajé house there, that 
area can’t be used for mining’ (Carlos Flores, interview, 14 
January 2007).
Community development led by the ‘intermediaries’
The ‘intermediaries’ also play an important role in the development of 
oil-affected communities. The roles of intermediary actors are diverse: 
they may act as supporters of indigenous movements, mediators in 
the oil conflict, funders of community development projects in oil-
affected communities or researchers of the oil conflict. Indigenous 
peoples and communities coordinate or seek the support of these 
‘intermediaries’ for different purposes, and the participation of the latter 
in their development can be short term, long term or intermittent. 
International environmental NGOs such as Amazon Watch, Rainforest 
Information Network, Oilwatch and their local counterparts are most 
likely to support indigenous peoples by organising a campaign against a 
particular oil company and providing information to the communities 
about the impacts of the industry and their collective rights. Other 
NGOs such as Oxfam support indigenous communities in such areas 
as governance and education; Oxfam has been active in evaluating how 
the ILO Convention 169 principle of prior and informed consent has 
been implemented in oil-affected communities. Intermediary actors 
such as political ecologists and the NGOs Acción Ecológica and Friends 
of the Earth have also helped in unmasking oppression by corporations 
and states and in recompensing indigenous peoples for past and current 
environmental and social injustices.
Through such collaboration indigenous peoples and the 
‘intermediaries’ nurture each other and solidarity links are created. 
Indigenous peoples gain technical and moral support, while NGOs 
gain the grassroots support of an important actor for their wider agenda 
against the expansion of extractive industries. However, NGOs and 
indigenous organisations have admitted in interviews that although 
they may have a common agenda they still need to work on issues 
such as representation, capacity building and ownership and that 
collaboration between them is still a learning process. It seems that there 
is a new tendency among indigenous organisations to become more 
selective of the number and quality of the community development 
projects that they decide to move forward, prioritising the real needs 
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of the community or organisation, its ability to manage funds and its 
participation in all stages of the project.
Academics, activists, the Ombudsman Office and the Catholic 
Church have also had an important role as mediators, advisers and 
human rights monitors in the oil conflict in recent years. Some of them 
become prominent as designers of campaigns against the oil industry 
and community development strategies. At the beginning of the oil 
industry in the Amazon region, the evangelical organisation SIL, the 
military and the Catholic Church were the only institutions in the 
area, and the Church therefore played a prominent role in community 
development and in opposing the abuses committed by the state and the 
military at that time. The Church continues to have a strong influence 
on state officials and society and often uses this power to raise the 
demands of indigenous peoples. However, the flood of NGOs that 
has arrived in Amazonia and the increasing involvement of advocacy 
NGOs in the oil conflict has led to friction with the Church, which 
is especially critical of the threat to indigenous peoples.
Looking for justice and redress: from environmental 
justice to ecological debt
The role of a community worker in these contexts is determined by 
whose interests they are employed to serve. The biggest employers 
of community workers are the oil corporations whose purpose is to 
obtain community consent for oil exploration and extraction and to 
promote a development model compatible with capitalist industry. 
While indigenous communities have obtained some concessions 
from negotiating with the powerful companies, including community 
development goals, this has inevitably been at the expense of loss of 
their land and environmental resources as well as cultural and spiritual 
erosion through the imposition of capitalist relations of production. 
As has been recognised elsewhere, community development is here 
a tool of neoliberalism, of achieving consent for the dispossession of 
resources in the interests of corporate capital. Where the state is absent 
or weak it is unable or unwilling to provide for alternative community 
development strategies. ‘Intermediaries’ who engage in community 
development are faced with the contradiction of falling into line with 
corporate dispossession or else helping to mobilise against it, in many 
cases relying on the mixed blessings of international solidarity.
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Some networks of NGOs, indigenous organisations and academics 
have developed discourses that help locate the struggles of communities 
in wider geopolitical and historical processes, such as environmental 
justice and ecological debt.
Environmental justice theories challenge dominant views of 
development by emphasising that the current model is built at the 
expense of unfair access to the earth’s resources and distribution 
of environmental impacts. Martínez-Alier (2002: 13–14) argues 
that the environmentalism of the poor, or environmental justice 
movements constitute a social response to an economic logic based 
on values incommensurable with those of communities. Community 
development processes in which the commercial valuation of a 
community’s resources is non-negotiable are flawed from the start. In 
such processes, alternative values based on indigenous cosmovision are 
tolerated only so long as they do not impede dispossession. However, 
environmental justice struggles emerge as part of a rejection of the 
imposed commercialisation of resources that are culturally valued in 
non-financial terms. Assessing and analysing the proposed engagement 
with oil companies’ CRPs and financial compensation packages 
requires a process involving critical community development. It means 
learning about structures of commercialisation on a scale that is largely 
alien to indigenous communities, articulating and asserting what is 
important in indigenous cultures and involving the wider community 
in negotiation, discernment and mobilising support. There is a strong 
interrelationship between environmental justice struggles and critical 
community development processes, whether facilitated by indigenous 
leaders or outsiders from ‘intermediate’ groups (Scandrett, 2000).
While principles of environmental justice focus on equity, ecological 
debt focuses on moral and economic redress. Ecological debt is an 
economic concept that exposes the legacy of the unfair distribution 
of resources and the subsequent conflicts this may bring. Neoclassical 
economics can only make sense of resource depletion, environmental 
damage, species extinctions or biodiversity loss by attaching a price 
to the intact resources in order to measure against the marginal price 
of development which accompanies the damage. However, this 
consistently undervalues the resources of communities whose poverty, 
political marginalisation or non-monetised social relations deny them 
market leverage. As a result, the value in market terms of the legacy of 
destruction and resource depletion under colonial and post-colonial 
exploitation is considerable, and far outweighs the financial debt of 
the countries’ governments accumulated through borrowing. Thus, 
the former colonised countries of the Global South are ecological 
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creditors to varying degrees, while the ‘developed’ countries owe an 
ecological debt to the rest of the world.
First, … the exports of raw materials and other products 
from relatively poor countries are sold at prices which do 
not include compensation for local or global externalities. 
Second, rich countries make a disproportionate use of 
environmental space or services without payment, and even 
without recognition of other people’s entitlements to such 
services (Martínez-Alier, 2002: 213).
The Oilwatch network describes various principles which show how 
the oil industry creates ecological debt: from how oil export prices do 
not include the costs related to the externalities they produce, to the 
contribution of the industry to climate change and the extermination 
of indigenous cultures (Oilwatch International, 2000). Ecological 
debt does not imply a precise calculation to measure the financial 
compensation required for repayment – this would be almost impossible 
to measure and require buying in to the neoclassical logic that ecological 
models of economics seek to critique. However, as a political and moral 
tool, the ecological debt concept demonstrates the intrinsic relationship 
between the exploitation of the resources of the Global South and the 
wealth of the Global North. The dispossessed indigenous communities 
of Amazonian Ecuador and Peru are therefore ecological creditors 
morally, if not legally entitled to recompense. And for community 
development workers in the Global North, indebted status shifts the 
terms of engagement with communities in impoverished communities 
at home. Community development that incorporates an understanding 
of ecological debt leads to potentially radically new strategies of 
addressing issues such as housing, fuel poverty, land use planning, anti-
pollution campaigns and resource exploitation at home.
The model of environmental justice requires indigenous and outsider 
community workers to support mobilisation against the oil corporations 
and their agents, including those who implement CRP. Ecological 
debt, moreover, is a tool which has been used by community workers 
across the world to generate international solidarity among all those 
who are dispossessed by the economic logic of neoliberalism.
Notes
1 In the research study, all representatives of the oil industry requested anonymity. 
Permission was granted by most ‘intermediaries’ and ‘survivors’ to use their names. 
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Nonetheless, pseudonyms have been used throughout the chapter to protect 
participants’ identities.
2 SIL International (current name of the former Summer Institute of Linguistics) 
started in 1934 to train missionaries in basic linguistic, anthropological and translation 
principles. The group has been denounced for using a scientific name to conceal its 
religious and capitalist agenda (Bonner, 1999: 20). SIL has been expelled from Brazil, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Panama, and restricted in Colombia and Peru (Cleary and 
Steigenga, 2004: 36).
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